While we are witnessing the escalation of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, the phenomenon of terrorism has not ceased to exist, especially on the African continent, where Islamic extremist groups continue to claim victims in their attacks. As noted in the latest monitoring published by the Washington-based Center for Strategic Studies on Africa, in the last ten years the violence of militant Islamist groups in the macro-region has increased by 300% and has doubled compared to 2019, focusing mainly in two theaters: the Western Sahel and Somalia. The direct consequence of the exponential expansion of the insurgency is the simultaneous increase in the number of African countries affected by the sustained activity of Islamic radical groups, which from five in 2010 reached 20 in 2022. Very eloquent numbers, which testify to the constant increase in the levels of violence of Islamic extremism in Africa, at the origin of which there are various primary factors attributable to poverty, marginalization and underdevelopment. These are often accompanied by low levels of education, lack of contact with other ethnic groups, absent parents during childhood and a minimal understanding of the fundamental principles of Islam. Meanwhile, Salafist-inspired groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State are taking root in many areas of the continent, where they can find a governance vacuum that allows terrorist groups to gain the space they need to operate. The most obvious example was recorded in Mali, where French troops had led the Serval and Barkhane counter-terrorism missions since 2013, and then announced the withdrawal of the latter in mid-February and completed in mid-August. The French military repositioned itself in the neighboring countries of the Sahel, in particular Niger and Chad, to continue the fight against the jihadist insurgency together with the men of the European Takuba mission, taking away a precious ally from the increasingly weakened G5 Sahel regional force and the mission integrated multidimensional United Nations in Mali (Minusma), to fight against Islamist militants in Mali. Neither the government army, nor the Russian contractors of the Wagner Group, which began deploying in Mali since January 6, have so far shown that they can fill the void left by the two French-led counter-terrorism operations. Some observers believe that the counter-terrorism missions are heavily penalized by structural problems and operational errors, which have led to the failure of Barkhane in Mali. While corruption would have undermined the US effort to train an effective counter-terrorism force in Somalia. Undoubtedly, such missions have had short-term effects, involving the destruction of insurgent leadership, recapturing territory stolen by jihadist forces, and preventing extremist groups from coordinating larger attacks locally or transnationally. However, military victories only buy time to solve the most difficult problem, that of filling the gaps in governance and the increase in underdevelopment, which favor the outbreak of Islamist insurrections by reinforcing the motivations that produced the insurrection. Past events show that giving extremist groups more freedom of action can only fuel the threat of terrorism, creating the ideal context for global jihadists to plan large-scale attacks, hone their skills and accumulate resources. For example, between 2009 and 2010, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Shabaab in Somalia went from regional to global threats, relying on local capabilities and militants to plan attacks on airliners of US and African companies. Without forgetting that Africa is becoming increasingly strategic for the Islamic State, which finds fertile ground there for radicalization and the expansion of its interests, as confirmed by the editorial published last June 16 in al-Naba, the weekly of ISIS propaganda. In the statement, the Islamic State praises its fighters and encourages them to emigrate to the continent to establish new operational bases to support fighters in Mozambique, Mali, Nigeria and Sahel, urging them to continue the struggle until the rebirth of the Caliphate, which for four years it had taken control of a large area between northeastern Syria and western Iraq. An alarming scenario, in which it is possible that the jihadists will not limit themselves to local affirmations, but, spurred on by successes, they will carry out new offensives on enemies near and far, which they have never forgotten.
